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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the court utilized the actual use doctrine in finding that the lien
had not been filed in time to meet the statutory requirement.
Jurisdictions adjacent to North Dakota have adopted varying
viewpoints as to which doctrine to apply That Montana takes a
stricter view as to use is demonstrated by the fact that Montana
by statute22 and through case interpretation 23 places the burden
of proof on the lien claimant, and he must show actual use or
no lien attaches. South Dakota courts state that the requirement
of actual use is the better rule and further state that it is incumbent
on the contractor to see that his goods are actually used.24 Minnesota
has one of the most generous courts in allowing mechanics' liens
25
and consequently adopts the more liberal presumptive use doctrine
under which delivering or furnishing of goods is sufficient for a lien
to attach unless the owner rebuts the presumption.
Although the North Dakota statute requires use, 26 our courts
have adopted a liberal viewpoint 27 and follow the presumptive use
doctrine. This interpretation relieves the materialman of the burden
of watching his material until it is put into the structure or consumed
in the process and places the burden of proof on the owner who is
in a better position to prove non-use than is the materialman to
prove actual use. Notably North Dakota's statute goes further than
some others as it allows the mechanics' lien to attach the land on
which the structure is located as well as the structure itself.2 8 North
Dakota also allows the mechanics' lien priority over all other at-
tachments if filed within the statutory period, however, failure to
file within the statutory period will not bar the lien, but the priority
will then be determined by the order in which they are filed.2 9
DAVID L. PETERSON
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF A DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL
INTEREST-SUFFICIENCY OF TRUSTWORTHINESS-Plamtiff sued dece-
dent's estate for the return of stolen money An accomplice, while
22. MONT. REV. CODE § 45-502 (1947).
23. Rogers-Templeton Lumber Co. v. Welch, 56 Mont. 321, 184 Pac. 838 (1919).
24. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Leary, 25 S.D. 256, 126 N.W 271 (1910).
25. See, generally, 39 A.L.R.2d 406.
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-01 (1961).
27. McCauli-Webster Elevator Co. v. Adams, 39 N.D. 259, 167 N.W 330 (1918).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-19 (1961).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-22 (1961). It should also be noted that the Uniform
Commercial Code which is now effective in North Dakota has no effect on statutory liens
such as the mechanics' liens. This Is stated in 41-09-04.
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in the custody of Chicago police, stated that he, deceased and another
had stolen the money in question. This was the only evidence that
linked deceased to the theft. The Court of Appeals of Arizona held,
the statement was admissible as a declaration against a penal in-
terest, but felt that the statement did not fulfill the requirement of
trustworthiness since declarant was incarcerated for murder, thus
this statement could not be against his interest-pecuniary, propri-
etary or penal. Dieke v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company,
415 P.2d 145 (Ariz. 1966)
This case is in holding with a trend of decisions that have
recognized the admissibility of a declaration against a penal interest,
contrary to the majority rule which allows only those declarations
which are against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the
declarant.1 Perhaps the instigation of this trend was brought about
as far back as 1913 when Justice Holmes, in a vigorous dissent,
pointed out that a declaration against a penal interest was likely
to be the most convincing of any type of statement.2 The majority
rule was again attacked in 1923 when the Virginia Court intimated
that under the proper circumstances it would hold such a statement
admissible8 In 1964 California unequivocally overruled the majority
rule and held a declaration against penal interest to be admissible.
4
The court seemed to have little reluctance in arriving at this
decision since it had previously intimated that a declaration against
a penal interest should be admissible.5 The courts in other states
have adopted the minority view although some limit its application
to the particular facts involved.6 This trend is supported by the
Uniform Rules of Evidence.7 The adoption of these uniform rules,
however, has not been widespread.8
Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted therein, 9 and such statement is generally
1. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1915) In re Andrews' Estate,
Iowa 819, 64 N.W.2d 261 (1954) Brown v. Warner. 78 S.D. 647, 107 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
2. Donnelly v. United States, sUpra note 1.
3. See Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
4. People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d 868, 389 P.2d 377 (1964).
5. See People v. One 1948 Chev'olet Convertible Coupe, 45 Cal.2d 613, 290 P.2d 538
(1955)
6. E.g.. Sutter v. Easterly 345 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945) (third person's
affidavit making statements against penal interest admitted although he refused to testify
claiming right against self-incrimination) Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 30, 114 S.W
814 (1908) (hearsay declaration admissible if prosecution's evidence Is solely circum-
circumstantial, and It is shown that declarant might have committed the crime) People
v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952) (third person's confession admissible where
prosecution's sole evidence was defendant's repudiated confession) Brennan v. State, 151
Md. 265, 134 Ati. 148 (Ct. App. 1926) (hearsay declaration of paternity admitted in behalf
of defendant prosecuted for bastardy) McClain v. Anderson Free Press, 232 S.C. 448, 102
S.E.2d 750 (1958) (approved rule admitting declarations against penal interest, but holding
evidence Inadmissible under facts of case).
7. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENcE 63 (10).
8. See KAN. STAT. ANN. ch 60 § 460(J) (1963).
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not admissible in evidence because it does not have the sanction
of oath and cross-examination."0 The courts have arrived at various
exceptions to the rule, one of which is a declaration against interest,
based on the probability of such a statement being trustworthy."
Other requirements for this exception are that the declarant must
be unavailable 12 and that he have particular knowledge of the facts
relative to the issue.1 3 As to unavailability, the courts are not in
complete harmony Some courts allow only declarations of deceased
persons14 while others feel that if declarant is unavailable for any
practical reason, he should be considered unavailable.15 Although
unavailability takes away the sanctions of the oath and cross-
examination, it seems the courts rest assured that by human nature
one does not deliberately jeopardize his interests."
The admissibility of a declaration against interest has been
recognized in England since the 17th Century,"7 the English Courts
originally holding such statements admissible regardless of the in-
terest affected thereby 18 But in 1844 the House of Lords held, In
The Sussex Peerage case, that only a declaration against a pecuni-
ary or proprietary interest would be admissible.19 This was definitely
a backward step from previous decisions and was probably a mis-
interpretation. The case relied on by the House of Lords involved
proving the date of birth of a child and the records of a mid-man
were held admissible to show that he had been paid for his services
on a certain day 20 Perhaps recognizing that it was against the
mid-man's pecuniary interest to mark the account paid, the court
in the Sussex case held that only a declaration against a pecuniary
or proprietary interest would be admissible. Although this was not
the rule established by the prior decisions, the House of Lords
interpreted the extensive arguments of that case to mean that the
rule should not be carried too far The House of Lords apparently
felt that by allowing a declaration against a pecuniary interest,
the exception was extended to its maximum. This became the rule
9. See Gurganus v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 246 N.C. 655, 100 S.E.2d 81 (1957).
10. See Hines v. Commonwealth, supra note 3 at 847.
11. E.g., Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 26 Cal. 575, 160 P.2d 21 (1945).
12. See People v. Spriggs, supra note 4 at 381.
13. See Weber v. Chicago, R. I. & P Ry. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W 852 (1915).
14. E.g., Beebe v. Kleldon, 242 Minn. 521, 65 N.W.2d 614 (1954).
15. E.g., Weber v. Chicago, R. I. & P Ry. Co.. supra note 13 at 861 (insanity)
Johnson v. Sleizer, 268 Minn. 421, 129 N.W.2d 761 (1964) (outside of Jurisdiction) Sutter
V. Easterly i45 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945) (claim of privilege against self Incrimina-
tion).
16. See Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
17. See Warren v. Greenville, 2 Stra. 1129, 93 Eng. Rep. 1079 (1740). See, generally,
5 WImoRE, EvTnaNcE §§ 1476, 1477 (1940, Supp. 1964).
18. See Middleton v. Melton, 10 B. & C. 317, 109 Eng. Rep. 467 (1829).
19. 11 Clark & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844).
20. See Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East 109, 103 Eng. Rep. 717 (1808).
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passed on to America as part of the English Common Law and
adopted by a majority of juisdictions.
21
As stated before, the basis of admitting hearsay into evidence,
if admitted at all, is due to its high probability of trustworthiness.
22
There does not appear to be a clearly enunciated reason why a
declaration against a penal interest should not be included in this
category, other than that it is not trustworthy. It will be conceded
that the veracity of a criminal may not be as reliable as that of a
model citizen, but it is submitted that this should go to the weight
of the statement rather than to its admissibility. Since this type
of evidence may be important in achieving justice, one would think
that the element of self-interest in itself would afford a substitute
for the oath and cross-examination. Moreover, there is little doubt
but that a conviction of crime involves economic loss, 2  thus, some
support may be extracted from the majority rule by demonstrating
that this is a pecuniary loss. Some merit may also be found in the
fact that under the existing conditions of our economic status,
one may be willing to tell "a little white lie" if it only involves
money, but may be very reluctant to make a statement which
would subject him to punishment for a crime. The situation becomes
extremely absurd when an accused person cannot use such a state-
ment to exonerate himself.24 Thus, the guilty party could sit in a
jail which is not within the jurisdiction of the court in which a
defendant is being tried and could make all kinds of statements,
sign confessions and plead guilty to the same crime, yet under the
majority rule, this defendant could not avail himself of these state-
ments. If this approach was followed, both persons could be accused
of a crime committed by only one.
The North Dakota Court has recognized the Hearsay Rule on
a few occasions in the past 20 years but has rendered no decision
on the admissibility of a declaration against interest. The court
seems to be quite conservative towards allowing exceptions to the
rule, as is illustrated by the case in which an engineer testified to
the loss sustained by the insured resulting from a fire. Although
the engineer did not refer to the report he had submitted to the
insurance adjuster, he did explain it fully in his testimony. The court
held the report inadmissible as hearsay since the engineer did not
use it to refresh his memory. 25 It would seem that since the person
21. E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1915), In re Andrews' Estate, 245
Iowa 819, 64 N.W.2d 261 (1954), Brown v. Warner, 78 S.D. 647, 107 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
22. See Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 26 Cal. 575, 160 P.2d 21 (1945).
23. See People v. Spriggs, 60 CaL2d 868, 389 P.2d 377 (1964).
24. See People v. Lettrich, 413 Il1. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952).
25. Grand Forks Building & Development Co. V Implement Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 75 N.D. 618, 31 N.W.2d 495 (1948).
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who had made the report was on the stand, had taken the oath and
was subject to cross-examination, a more liberal court would have
accepted the report.
26
Should this conservative attitude still prevail m our court, there
may be little chance of the adoption of the rule admitting declara-
tions against a penal interest. Yet, since there is no precedent to
bind the court as to the admissibility of a declaration against penal
interest, it is submitted that the court should, in a proper circum-
stance, adopt the minority view The court must use its discretion
to determine trustworthiness and unavailability, but by adopting the
minority view, after finding these requirements fulfilled, the court
will have an avenue conducive to its basic goal: "the search
for truth."
RONALD F SCHWARTZ
26. Of. City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Co., 404 P.2d 373 (Hawaii 1965).
